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RELEASE FROM INVOLUNTARY CUSTODIAL CONFINEMENT
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975)
In O'Connor v. Donaldson,' the United States
Supreme Court unanimously held that involuntary
custodial confinement in a state hospital, without
treatment, of a mental patient who is not dangerous
to himself or others violates the patient's constitu-
tional right to liberty. 2 The holding was a narrow
one, but it has far-reaching implications for the
administration of mental health laws in many states. 3
Respondent, Kenneth Donaldson, was civilly com-
mitted to the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoo-
chee in 1957 for "care, maintenance, and treat-
ment," pursuant to Florida statutory provisions that
have since been repealed. 4 He was confined there for
nearly fifteen years. Petitioner, Dr. J. B. O'Connor,
was superintendent at Chattahoochee during most of
'422 U.S. 563 (1975).
21d. at 573-76.
'Because so much of the opinions in this case deal with
the particular factual setting before the courts, it is
necessary to set forth the facts in detail.
'Donaldson had been adiudged mentally incompetent
under section 394.22(1) of the State Public Health Code
which provided the following standard for such findings:
[I]ncompetent by reason of mental illness, sickness,
drunkeness, excessive use of drugs, insanity, or other
mental or physical condition, so that he is incapable of
caring for himself or managing his property, or is
likely to dissipate or lose his property or become the
victim of designed persons, or inflict harm on him-
self of others ....
1955 Fla. Gen. Laws, ch. 29909, § 3,831 (now Florida
Mental Health Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467
(1975)) Donaldson was thenjudicially committed pursuant
to § 394.22(11) which provided:
Whenever any person who has been adjudged men-
tally incompetent requires confinement or restraint
to prevent self-injury or violence to others, the said
judge shall direct that such person be forthwith de-
livered to a superintendent of a Florida state hospital,
for the mentally ill, after admission has been author-
ized under regulations approved by the board of
commissioners of state institutions, for care, main-
tenance, and treatment, as provided in sections 394.09,
394.24, 394.25, 394.26, and 394.27, or make such
other disposition of him as may be permitted by law.
1955-1956 Fla. Laws Extra. Sess., ch. 31403, § 1,62 (now
Florida Mental Health Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
394.467 (1975)). In 1972 Florida revised its mental health
laws. The new provisions give the individual a statutory
right to receive individual medical treatment. FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 394.459(2), (4) (1975). See 422 U.S. at 566-67
n.2.
that time. I Donaldson repeatedly asked to be re-
leased from that facility, claiming that he was dan-
gerous neither to himself, nor to others, that he was
not mentally ill, and that, if he was mentally ill, he
was receiving no treatment. 6 His requests were re-
peatedly denied. 7 Then, in February, 1971, Don-
aldson instituted this suit under 72 U.S.C. § 1983 in
the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida, alleging that O'Connor and
other hospital staff members had intentionally and
maliciously deprived him of his constitutional right
to liberty. '
At the trial, uncontradicted testimony indicated
that Donaldson had never posed any danger to
others, either before or during his confinement. 9 Nor
was there any evidence that he had ever been suicidal
or thought likely to inflict injury upon himself. " His
employment record indicated that, both before his
confinement and after his release, Donaldson was
able to earn his own living outside the hospital. "
Donaldson's requests for release were supported
by responsible parties willing and able to provide
him any care he needed upon release. In 1963,
Helping Hands, Inc., a Minnepolis, Minnesota
halfway house for mental patients, asked O'Connor
to release Donaldson to its care. Its request was
supported by *the Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry
and Neurology. " O'Connor rejected that offer,
5422 U.S. at 564.
cId.
7Shortly after O'Connor retired as superintendent of
Chattahoochee and after the trial of this case began,
Donaldson obtained ajudicial restoration of his competency
and was released at the intiative of the hospital staff. 422
U.S. at 567-68 & n.3.
842 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, regu-
lation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
'422 U.S. at 568.
'Old.
"This factor was acknowledged by one of O'Connor's
codefendants at the trial. Id.
2One of O'Connor's codefendants conceded at trial that
the Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology was a
"good clinic." Id.
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stating that Donaldson, who was then fifty-five years
old, could only be released to his parents. 13 Other
requests for Donaldson's release and offers to care for
him were made on four separate occasions between
1964 and 1968 by John Lembcke, a college classmate
and longtime family friend of Donaldson. O'Connor
refused on each of those occasions. "4
The Supreme Court characterized the evidence
regarding Donaldson's treatment at Chattahoochee
as showing "a simple regime of enforced custodial
care, not a program designed to alleviate or cure his
supposed illness."" Numerous witnesses testified
to the same effect at trial. However, O'Connor
described Donaldson's treatment as "milieu
therapy." 16 Witnesses from the hospital staff testified
that, in Donaldson's case, that term was merely a
euphemism for confinement in the milieu of a mental
hospital. 7 He spent substantial periods of his com-
mitment in a large, sixty-patient ward which also
housed patients under criminal commitment. Don-
aldson's repeated requests for grounds privileges,
occupation therapy, and an opportunity to discuss his
case with staff members were denied. "
O'Connor's principal defense at trial was that he
"
5 0'Connor knew that Donaldson's parents were too
elderly to care for him. The rule that a patient could only
be released to his parents was apparently of O'Connor's
own making. 422 U.S. at 568-69.
"The record indicated that Lembcke was able and
willing to care for Donaldson. 422 U.S. at 569.
"Id. The appellate court likewise characterized Donald-
son's treatment as " ... nothing more than keeping
Donaldson in a sheltered hospital 'milieu' with other
mental patients .... " Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d
507, 511 (Sth Cir. 1974).
"The underlying premise of "milieu therapy" is that
the social and environmental milieu of the patient should be
structured so as to give each patient a recognition of his
human dignity, facilitate the provision of needed treatment
services, and provide a friendly, noninstitutional atmos-
phere. Cameron, Nonmedical Judgment of Medical Mat-
ters, 57 GEo. L.J. 716, 731-32 (1969). In the opinion of
some mental health professionals, milieu therapy has
legitimate value as a form of treatment and is often useful
either in conjunction with or as an alternative to other
forms of medical or shock treatment. See J. FRANK,
PERSUASION AND HEALING-A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
PSYCHOTHERAPY (1961); Cameron, supra note 16.
1"422 U.S. at 569. For the proposition that the term
"milieu therapy" is sometimes used as a smoke-screen to
cover up the lack of adequate treatment see Halpern, A
Practicing Layer Views the Right to Treatment, 57 GEO.
L.J. 782, 786-87 n.19 (1969).
18422 U.S. at 569. Donaldson, a Christian Scientist,
had occasionally refused to take medication which was
given to him at the hospital. The trial judge instructed the
jury not to award damages for any period during which
Donaldson refused treatment. Id. at n.4.
had acted in good faith. He argued that state law
permitted indefinite custodial confinement of the
mentally ill, even if they were not given treatment
and their release could harm no one. He allegedly
believed that law to be valid and acted in good faith
reliance upon it. "
The trial judge orally charged the jury in part that
in order for Donaldson to prove his claim under the
Civil Rights Act he had to establish inter alia:
That [O'Connor] confined [Donaldson] against his
will, knowing that he was not mentally ill or danger-
ous or knowing that if mentally ill he was not receiv-
ing treatment for his mental illness.
You are instructed that a person who is involuntar-
ily civilly committed to a mental hospital does have a
constitutional right to receive such treatment as will
gve him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to im-
prove his mental condition.
Now, the purpose of involuntary hospitalization is
treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment
if a patient is not a danger to himself or others. With-
out such treatment there is no justification from a con-
stitutional standpoint for continued confinement unless
you should also find that Donaldson was dangerous
either to himself or others. "
On the issue of O'Connor's immunity from damages,
the trial j udge instructed the jury that O'Connor was
immune if he
reasonably believed in good faith that detention of
[Donaldson] was proper for the length of time he was
so confined .... However, mere good intentions
which do not give rise to a reasonable belief that deten-
tion is lawfully required cannot justify [Donaldson's]
confinement.... 21
The jury returned a verdict for Donaldson, award-
ing him compensatory damages of S28,500 and
punitive damages of $10,000.12
In a broad opinion by Judge Wisdom, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judg-
"1Id. at 569-70.
20Id. at 571-72 n.6 (emphasis added).
21Id. at 571-72.
"Donaldson's complaint was filed against five hospital
and state mental health officials. The jury returned a
verdict against two of them, Dr. O'Connor and Dr. John
Gumanis. The latter was Donaldson's attending physician
at Chattahoochee from 1959 until 1967. The jury returned
a verdict in favor of the other three defendants. Both
O'Connor and Gumanis brought appeals of the district
court's judgment to the appellate court. Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1974). However,
only O'Connor petitioned for certiorari. 419 U.S. 894
(1974).
[Vol. 66
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ment of the district court. 23 The appellate court
found that on the record as a whole there was ample
evidence to support the jury's reaching any or all of
the following conclusions:
A. That defendants unjustifiably withheld from
Donaldson specific forms of treatment li.e. grounds
privileges, occupational therapy, and consultations
with staff psychiatrists and psychologists]; 24
B. That defendants recklessly failed to attend to
and treat Donaldson at precisely those junctures when
treatment could have most helped [him]; 25
C. That defendants wantonly, maliciously, or op-
pressively blocked efforts by responsible friends and
organizations to have Donaldson released to their
custody; 28
D. That defendants continued to confine Donald-
son knowing he was not dangerous, or with reckless
disregard for whether he was dangerous; 17 and
E. That defendants did not do the best they could
with available resources. 28
In light of these factual conclusions and the
defendant's challenge to the trial judge's instructions
to the jury on the question of treatment, the appellate
court stated the issue before it as follows: "[Wihether
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to
treatment to persons involuntarily civilly committed
to state mental hospitals." 29 Then, using a two-part
theory, the court of appeals held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees a
right to "such individual treatment as will give the
patient a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to
improve his mental condition." 30
The first part of the appellate court's theory
started with the proposition that any significant
governmental abridgement of the liberty which the
fourteenth amendment says shall not be denied
without due process of law must be justified by some
permissible governmental goal."i The court then
noted three justifications for civil commitment gener-
ally recognized in state statutes: danger to others, a
police power rationale; 32 need for treatment, a








"I1d. See Tribe, Forward-Toward a Model of Roles in
the Due Process of Life and Law, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17
(1973).
"Dangerousness to others is a legal basis for commit-
ment in a majority of states. It is similar to criminal
parens patriae rationale; 3 3 and danger to self, com-
bining elements of both the police power and parens
patriae rationales. 34 The court found, apparently on
the basis of the factual conclusions which it imputed
to the jury's verdict and the record, that the justifi-
cation for Donaldson's confinement was the parens
patriae rationale that the patient was -in need of
treatment. 35 The court then quoted with approval
from Wvatt v. Stickney36 as follows:
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the
altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane
therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate
treatment violates the very fundamentals of due proc-
ess. 37
The court stated that the due process clause requires
that minimally adequate treatment actually be pro-
confinement in that in both eases the state decides that
deprivation of the individual's liberty is necessary for the
protection of society at large. Unlike criminal imprison-
ment, confinement under this justification may be based on
a mere prediction that the individual is likely to commit a
dangerous act. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288,
1289-93 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment].
3 This basis for commitment is generally said to have
been first articulated in this country in In re Oakes, 8 Law
Rep. 122 (Mass. 1845). The standard applied there by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in affirming a
denial of a habeas corpus petition was stated to be "whether
restraint is necessary for [the patient's] restoration, or will
be conducive thereto." Id. at 125. The theory regards the
government as the guardian of those members of society
unable to care for themselves. Civil Commitment, supra
note 32, at 1295.
34The justification that the patient is dangerous to
himself involves the parens patriae notion that government
must look after the individual who is incapable of looking
after himself. A police power justification comes into play in
much the same way as it does when government makes
attempted suicide a crime. Civil Commitment, supra note
32, at 1293-94.
35See notes 9-11, 27 and accompanying text supra.
36493 F.2d at 521.
"325 F. Supp. 781,785 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974). Wyatt was a class action brought by the guardians of
patients, most of whom were involuntarily civilly commit-
ted, at an Alabama state hospital for the mentally ill. They
sought a determination of the adequacy of treatment
provided at the facility in light of severe cut-backs in
hospital personnel due to a shortage of state revenues. The
district court held that the patients had a due process right
to receive such individual treatment as would give each of
them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve their
mental condition. It found the unit-team approach in use at
the hospital to be scientifically and medically inadequate for
that purpose. State officials were, therefore, ordered to
formulate a conforming plan. The appellate court affirmed.
19751
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vided. " Since it had not, in fact, been provided in
Donaldson's case, the nature of the commitment bore
no rational relation to its purpose and constituted a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. 3 9
The second part of the appellate court's theory did
not distinguish between commitments under the
parens patriae rationale and those under the police
power rationale." ° It was termed a quid pro quo
theory and was based on this principle:
[Wihen the three central limitations on the govern-
ment's power to detain-that detention be in retribu-
tion for a specific offense; that it be limited to-a fixed
term; and that it be permitted after a proceeding
where fundamental procedural safeguards are ob-
served-are absent, there must be a quidpro quo ex-
tended by the government to justify confinement.
(citation omitted) 41
The court noted that the quid pro quo most com-
monly recognized is the provision of rehabilitative
treatment, or, where rehabilitation is impossible,
"minimally adequate habilitation and care beyond
the subsistence level custodial care that would be
provided in a penitentiary. '"42 Finding that Donald-
son had been provided with neither, the court of
appeals saw no justification for his continued con-
finement. Therefore, it affirmed the judgment of the
district court.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by .Justice
Stewart, 4 3 took a much more narrow view of the case
than did the court of appeals. The Court began the
substance of its opinion by stating that the jury had
found that Donaldson was dangerous neither to
himself nor to others, and also that, if mentally ill, he
had received no treatment. " That verdict gave the
Court no occasion to consider whether, when, or by
what procedures a mentally ill individual may be
confined on any of the grounds typically advanced by
state statutes-danger to self, danger to others, and
cure or treatment.4 5 Since the jury had found that
none of those grounds for continued confinement
were present in Donaldson's case, the Court had no
58493 F.2d at 521.
3 'Id., citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972).
40493 F.2d at 521-25.
"Id. at 522 & n.22.
"Id. at 522.
43422 U.S. 563 (1975).
"Id. at 573 & n.8.
"See McNeil v. Director, 407 U.S. 245, 246-49 (1972);
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v.
Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972); Developments in the
Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190, 1319-24 (1974).
occasion to consider whether, if present, they were
constitutionally valid. 4
O'Connor had argued that, despite the jury's
verdict, the Court must assume that Donaldson was
receiving adequate treatment. His position was es-
sentially that, if a right to treatment were recognized
by the Court, an assumption he opposed, it could not
be effectively applied because judges and juries,
untrained in medicine and psychiatry, cannot "sec-
ond guess" the judgment of mental health
professionals. ' Thus, he argued that the question
of whether a patient was receiving adequate treat-
ment was a nonjusticiable question that must be
left to professionals.4
The Court rejected O'Connor's argument on that
score, treating it only briefly in a footnote.' 9 It
stated:
Where "treatment" is the sole asserted ground for de-
priving a person of liberty, it is plainly unacceptable
to suggest that the courts are powerless to determine
whether the asserted ground is present.n°
The Court then noted that neither party had objected
to the trial judge's instruction to the jury defining
"treatment."'" That factor, coupled with the jury's
verdict that no treatment had in fact been provided,
obviated consideration of whether the provision of
any treatment, standing alone, could ever constitu-
tionally justify confinement." Likewise, the even
more difficult questions of how much and what kind
of treatment would be constitutionally permissible
grounds for confinement were not presented by the
posture of the case. Once the Court adopted this
narrow view of the issue before it, the difficult
"The Court pointed out that the case involved no
challenge to Donaldson's initial commitment. Rather, the
Court was focusing on his continued confinement. 422 U.S.
at 565-67.
"Brief for Petitioner at 25-45, O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
"On the difficulty of medical judgments in the mental
health field and the particular problems they pose for the
courts see, e.g., Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366
(1956); United States v. Klein, 325 F.2d 283 (2d Cir.
1963); J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSY-
CHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1967);
R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1973); Cameron,
Nonmedical Judgment of Medical Matters, 57 GEo. L. J.
716 (1969); Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchant-
ing Legal Fiction, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755 (1969); Szasz,
The Right to Psychiatric Treatment: Rhetoric and Reality,
57 GEO. L.J. 740 (1969); Note, Guaranteeing Treatment
for the Mental Patient: The Troubled Enforcement of an
Elusive Right, 32 MD. L. REV. 42 (1972).
'"422 U.S. at 574 n.10.
50 Id., citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
51422 U.S. at 570-71 n.6.
12See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 66
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problems inherent in judicial examination of the
propriety of professional judgment in this field did
not arise."
Up to this point, the Court seemed to be dealing
with justifications for involuntary confinement in a
general sense. Its next step was to recognize a
distinction between a constitutionally adequate basis
for initial confinement on the one hand, and for
continued involuntary confinement on the other. The
Court found Florida law and the record unclear as to
the precise basis for Donaldson's initial commitment.
However, it regarded those factors as irrelevant
because the case involved no challenge to the initial
commitment, but rather the constitutional adequacy
of the continued confinement."' Although Donald-
son's initial confinement may have had a permissible
basis, it could not continue once the basis no longer
existed. The Court did not elaborate on the founda-
tion for this distinction, but its references to Jackson
v. Indiana" and McNeil v. Director, " indicate that
it was contemplating a due process issue." As the
"See note 45 supra.
"1422 U.S. at 565-67 n.2.
5-406 U.S. 715 (1972). Jackson involved a mentally
defective deaf mute who was confined after being found
incompetent to stand trial for robbery. In the opinion of
experts, it was unlikely that his condition would ever
improve, and, therefore, he would probably never become
competent to stand trial. The Court held that Indiana's
indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on
account of the lack of capacity to stand trial violated the due
process clause. The state was told that it could only confine
him under its "competency to stand trial" statutes for a
reasonable time to determine if he could go to trial. If
improvement in his condition was not possible, the state
could only confine him after civil commitment if it intended
to hold him indefinitely. By subjecting him to a more
lenient commitment standard under the criminal provisions
and to a more stringent standard of release than those
generally applicable to all other persons not charged with
offenses, Indiana had deprived him of equal protection.
58407 U.S. 245 (1972). In McNeil, petitioner was given
a five-year sentence after conviction for two assaults.
Instead of committing him to prison, the sentencing court
referred him under an ex parte order to the Patuxent
Institution for examination to determine whether he should
be committed for an indefinite term as a defective delin-
quent. His sentence expired before that determination was
made, yet his confinement continued. In a proceeding for
post-conviction relief, he challenged his confinement after
expiration of his sentence as violative of due process. The
trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that, in the circumstances of the case, it was a
denial of due process to continue to hold the petitioner on
the basis of an ex parte order committing him to observation
without the procedural safeguards commensurate with a
long-term commitment.
"This was Donaldson's view as well. See Brief for
Respondent at 56-59, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
Court has previously held, the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment requires that when gov-
ernment abridges protected liberties for some consti-
tutionally permissible purpose, the means of that
abridgement must bear a rational relation to the
purpose. 5 'In Jackson, the Court stated the rule:
At the least, due process requires that the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose for which the individual is com-
mitted. 59
The Court applied that reasoning by stating that a
finding of "mental illness" alone, assuming that that
term can satisfactorily be defined and that "mentally
ill" individuals can be identified with some accu-
racy, 60 did not provide a permissible basis for indef-
inite confinement with merely custodial care. 61 The
Court had earlier interpreted the jury's verdict as
comprehending the following conclusions: Donald-
son was not dangerous to others; he was not danger-
ous to himself; and, if he was mentally ill, he had
received no treatment. .6 Therefore, none of the tra-
ditional justifications for continued confinement
were present. The Court summarized the rule it
laid out in these terms:
[A] State cannot constitutionally confine without more
a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of will-
ing and responsible family members or friends."3
Since O'Connor, acting as an agent of the state, did
so confine Donaldson, the jury properly concluded
that O'Connor violated Donaldson's constitutional
right to liberty. 64
Such a finding, however, was not enough to
impose monetary liability upon O'Connor under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. O'Connor had argued that he had
acted in good faith reliance on state law which he
believed authorized indefinite confinement of the
non-dangerous mentally ill. 65 His position was that
563 (1975). See also Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct.,
407 U.S. 355 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504
(1972).
"'See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
11406 U.S. at 738 (emphasis added).
60Cf. Szasz, The Right to Health, 57 GEo. L.J. 734, 741
(1969).
61422 U.S. at 575.
61See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
63422 U.S. at 576.
6 4 1d.
61The Court stated that the fact that state law might
have authorized this confinement was not itself a constitu-




since he could not be expected to anticipate the con-
stitutional invalidity of that law, 6" he could not be
liable for monetary damages under section 1983. 67
The district court had denied a requested instruction
to that effect. '6 It instructed the jury instead that
compensatory damages could not be awarded to
Donaldson if O'Connor reasonably believed, in good
faith, that continued confinement was "proper" and
that punitive damages could not be awarded unless
O'Connor had acted "maliciously or wantonly or
oppressively." 69 The court of appeals approved the
instructions which were given, but did not consider
whether the trial judge erred in refusing the prof-
fered instruction regarding O'Connor's claimed
reliance on state law. 71
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's most recent
decision on the scope of state officials' qualified im-
munity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Wood v. Strick-
land, " was rendered after the decisions below in
this case. The Court felt that the adequacy of the
trial judge's instructions should be considered in
light of Wood. 72 Quoting from that opinion, the
Court stated that the proper standard for the jury
was whether O'Connor
knew or reasonably should have known that the action
he took within his sphere of official responsibility
would violate the constitutional rights of [Donaldson],
or if he took the action with the malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other in-
jury to [Donaldson]. 11
This standard would appear to give O'Connor
considerably more immunity from monetary liability
than did the district court's standard.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment of the court of appeals and remanded the case.
Upon remand the appellate court was to consider
only the question of O'Connor's liability under the
Wood standard for damages for violating Donald-
son's constitutional right to liberty. Since the jury's
finding that O'Connor had deprived Donaldson of
6 The Court's decision did not hold the Florida statutes
to be unconstitutional. In fact, the statutes upon which
O'Connor allegedly relied were totally revamped prior to
the argument of this case. See note 4 and accompanying text
supra.
67422 U.S. at 576. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975).
65422 U.S. at 570 n.5.
691d. at 576-77.
70493 F.2d at 527-28.
7 1420 U.S. 308 (1975).
72422 U.S. at 577.
3420 U.S. at 322. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
247-48 (1974). See also text accompanying note 21 supra.
his constitutional right to liberty was, in the Court's
opinion, based on substantial evidence and adequate
instructions, that issue could not be considered fur-
ther on remand. "
Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion in
the case. " At the outset, he emphasized two factors
going to the issue of O'Connor's official immunity
which he thought merited more attention than the
Court's opinion had given them. First was the
evidence that Donaldson, a Christian Scientist, had,
as Chief Justice Burger put it, "consistently refused
treatment that was offered to him."' 76 Second, and
more significant in Chief Justice Burger's opinion,
was that on numerous occasions Donaldson had
unsuccessfully sought his release in the state courts
of Florida. 77 Chief Justice Burger saw these factors
as favorable to O'Connor's good faith defense and,
therefore, favorable to his immunity claim.
Next, Chief Justice Burger attacked the district
court's instruction to the jury that persons involun-
tarily civilly committed have a constitutional right to
such treatment as will give them a realistic oppor-
tunity for cure, and the court of appeals' approval of
that instruction."S He acknowledged that the ma-
jority's opinion lent no support to the right to treat-
ment holdings of the lower courts, 7 but then de-
tailed his own disagreement with the lower courts.
The district court judge's instructions to the jury
did not, he believed, require the jury to make any
findings regarding the specific grounds for Donald-
son's confinement. Therefore, Chief Justice Burger
concluded that the first part of the court of appeals'
theory assumed, at least with respect to nondanger-
ous individuals, that the provision of treatment was
the only justifiable basis for confinement by the
state. " He disagreed with the validity of that pre-
sumption.
Chief Justice Burger's historical analysis led him
to conclude that the right to treatment theory is a
relatively new concept," with no historical basis.
11422 U.S. at 577-78 n.12.
"Id. at 578.
"Id. A majority of the Court had characterized the
frequency of Donaldson's refusal as "on occasion." 422
U.S. at 569 n.4.
77422 U.S. at 579 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 234 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970).
71422 U.S. at 580-89 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See
notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra.
"See 422 U.S. at 577-78 n.12. See also United States
v. Musingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
1o422 U.S. at 581-82 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
"
1The seminal article dealing with this theory was
Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499
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Conversely, he found that the states have historically
been vested with the parens patriae power. 8" In
Chief Justice Burger's opinion, that power could
legitimately be exercised within due process limita-
tions to confine those individuals whose mental
illnesses are "untreatable in the sense that no ef-
fective therapy has yet been discovered for them,
and that rates of 'cure' are generally low." 3 The
Chief Justice also felt that Donaldson's illness, diag-
nosed as paranoid schizohrenia, fell into the "un-
treatable" category. 8' At the least, he would leave
the decision of whether to exercise the power to
provide custodial care with the state legislature. 85
The Chief.Justice also disapproved of the quid pro
quo theory employed by the court of appeals. He
feared that it could be read to permit a state to
confine an individual solely on the ground that the
state was willing to provide treatment, without
regard to the individual's ability to function safely in
freedom, thus raising "the gravest of constitutional
problems."86 Such an approach was too inflexible to
comport with due process requirements. 87 Further-
more, Chief Justice Burger saw the quid pro quo
theory as elevating a concern for essentially proce-
dural safe-guards to a new substantive constitutional
right. The wide divergence of medical opinion in this
field presented special problems which he thought
could not be squared with the principle that courts
cannot substitute their own views of the public
welfare for those of the legislatures. 8 He did
think that the adequacy of a state's procedures and
(1960). See also Editorial, A New Right, 46 A.B.AJ. 516
(1960).82For an historical overview see generally A. DEuTscH,
THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1949); D.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE AsYLui (1971).
83422 U.S. at 584 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See Ennis
& Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693,
697-719 (1974); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the
Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV.
75, 93 & n.52 (1968); Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective
Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 936, 941-48 (1974).
84422 U.S. at 584 n.6 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
88422 U.S. at 584-85 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
"ld. at 585.
"
7Past decisions of the Court have emphasized the
flexibility of the due process requirement and the need to
identify and accommodate the competing interests involved
in any given factual situation. See, e.g., Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-84 (1972); McNeil v. Director,
407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 545-55 (1971).
88422 U.S. at 587 (Burger, C.J., concurring), citing
Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond
Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
the continuation of particular confinements were
questions ultimately for the courts, aided by expert
opinion. He did not, however, believe that it was
within the traditional scope of judicial review for
courts to tell the states that the provision of certain
benefits was adequate "compensation" for
confinement. 89
The posture in which this case reached the Court
facilitated the narrow ground of the decision. Several
factors contributed to this. First, this was not a case
seeking institution-wide relief for a class. '0 If it had,
it could have presented difficult problems of the
availability of state resources that might have been
required to administer a remedy. Second, and even
more basic, the plaintiff-respondent was not seeking
the provision of affirmative treatment. Rather, he
claimed that he had a right either to treatment or
release. "' Thus, Donaldson was not asking the Court
to decide whether the provision of treatment alone
could constitutionally justify confinement. Third, the
case did not present the question of whether a
particular type or level of treatment was permissible,
since the jury's verdict was interpreted by both the
appellate court and the Supreme Court as finding
that Donaldson had received no treatment at all. 92 In
light of these factors, the Court and Chief Justice
Burger were justified in their criticism of the over-
breadth of the appellate court's decision.
As the decision stands, it offers little precedent,
either pro or con, for a right to treatment argument.
The Court specifically stated that it was not reaching
that issue. " Rather, the main significance of this case
appears to lie in its holding that a state mental health
89422 U.S. at 587 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
9 Donaldson's original complaint was filed as a class
action on behalf of himself and all other patients in a
department of the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee.
The original complaint sought habeas corpus relief as well
as damages for all members of the class. It also sought
declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the hospital to
provide treatment. After Donaldson's release, the district
court dismissed the case as a class action. Donaldson then
filed an amended complaint on his own behalf and
eliminated his request for declaratory and injunctive relief
prior to trial. See 422 U.S. at 565 n.1. For cases that did
involve claims for institution-wide relief see Welsch v. Li-
kins, 373 F. Supp. 487(D. Minn. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney,
334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Com-
ment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly Com-
mited Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1282 (1972).
9 Brief for Respondent at 33-41, O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
92See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
93422 U.S. at 573-74.
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official who merely confines a non-dangerous patient
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom,
without treating him, can be held liable for damages
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It should be emphasized
that this was not a case of hospital personnel
committing an affirmative act, such as abusing a
patient, which resulted in the imposition of liability.
Rather, O'Connor's passive refusal to release Don-
aldson was the basis of his liability. However, in
light of the rather broad immunity rule of Wood v.
Strickland 94 which the Court applied, it appears
that the state official does not lose his qualified im-
munity unless he acts with the malicious intention
to deprive the patient of his constitutional rights.
Viewed in that light, the decision may be requiring
conduct tantamount to an affirmative act as a pre-
requisite of liability. Hopefully, the ultimate dispo-
sition of the liability issue upon remand will clarify
this point.
While this decision may prove to be useful as the
basis for analogy in other types of due process cases
involving involuntary confinement,9 5 the specific
94420 U.S. 308 (1975).
5 For example, criminal law practitioners might attempt
to add O'Connor to their arsenal of civil liberties victories.
It must be emphasized at the outset, however, that both the
appellate court and the Supreme Court in this case
interpreted the jury's verdict as finding that Donaldson was
dangerous neither to himself nor to others. In that situation,
the parens patriae rationale alone is insufficient to justify
continued confinement. On the other hand, where the
mentally ill individual is dangerous, the police power
rationale provides a traditional basis for confinement apart
from the provision of treatment, although perhaps not
indefinitely, without subjecting the confinement to a due
process attack. After all, the state should not be able to do
civilly what it could not do criminally, viz., incarcerate for
an extended period of time a person who has committed no
crime. Nevertheless, an argument for a criminal defendant
based on O'Connor, where the asserted justification for
confinement seems to be the parens patriae rationale, i.e.,
that the individual is in need of treatment, might be
inappropriate. This is especially true where the criminal
defendant has been found to be dangerous to others. Cf.
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-37 (1971).
However, even in the criminal context, there are situa-
tions in which the need for treatment is at least a partial
basis for confinement. Sexual psychopath laws and defective
delinquency laws which provide for confinement in mental
institutions under certain circumstances and commitment of
persons acquitted by reason of insanity are examples. In
those situations persons who might otherwise be confined in
jails are hospitalized, or at least segregated into particular
types of confinement facilities, presumably because they are
in need of some type of treatment. This certainly resembles
the parens patriae justification. It frequently happens that
the time an individual spends in a facility for defective
deliquents, for example, exceeds the time that the same
holding is narrow indeed. The Court neither upheld
a right to treatment for patients in Donaldson's
situation, nor a duty on the part of state officials to
provide treatment. It should be noted, however, that
several of the statements in Chief Justice Burger's
concurrence, which was considerably broader in
scope than the majority opinion, are not inevitable
implications of the Court's opinion. In particular,
the majority might not agree with his analysis of the
constitutionally permissible scope of the state's par-
ens patriae power. "
In summary neither the factors which contributed
to the narrow ground of this decision nor the
traditional limitations on the scope of judicial
review 97 should have prevented the Court from
offering more guidance on the right to treatment
issue. The Court plainly viewed the issue of whether
treatment was provided as a justiciable question."
And other courts that have considered this issue have
successfully avoided enmeshing themselves in the
intricacies of assessing the relative merits of various
courses of treatment. " The respondent's brief ex-
individual would have spent in jail had he not been deemed
in need of mental health services. See, e.g., McNeil v.
Director, 407 U.S. 245 (1972). In such cases it might
effectively be argued that custodial confinement, without
treatment, unconstitutionally prolongs the time during
which the individual is deprived of his liberty beyond that
time he would have served in the absence of the mental
disorder. To minimize the possibility of this happening,
court-supervised procedures need to be established which
provide for frequent evaluation of the person's mental
condition.
The question remains whether, once a criminal defend-
ant is adjudged to have a mental disorder and is removed to
a mental institution, the parens patriae rationale then
supercedes the police power rationale, and the "patient"
then must be treated immediately or returned to prison.
Since prisons also serve as a place of confinement for
dangerous individuals under the police power rationale,
perhaps the "patient" should either have the option to
select the institution in which he is to serve his sentence, or
to be given such treatment as will "give him a realistic
opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condi-
tion." See note 20 supra. In the absence of treatment, there
seems to be no logical reason for confining the dangerous
"patient" in a mental institution prior to the completion of
his term of incarceration.
9
"Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
"Cf. In re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11422 U.S. at 574 n.10.
"
9See, e.g., Tribby v Cameron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the
Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate
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tracted a number of valuable guidelines from both
individual and class actions in this area. The brief
stated one such guideline:
Judicial enforcement of the right to treatment has not,
thus far, required doctors to demonstrate that a par-
ticular course of treatment would cure or improve
the patient's mental condition, but only to show that
there was a bona fide effort and a reasonable oppor-
tunity to cure or improve that condition. 101
Treatment, 86 HARV. L. R~v. 1282 (1973); Note, The
Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. Rev. 1134 (1967).
100Brief for Respondent at 65-68, O'Connor v. Donald-
son, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
° Id. at 65-66.
The application of this guideline could use objective
professional standards to establish a threshold level
of constitutionally required treatment, while still
leaving substantial discretion with mental health
professionals to pick and choose among acceptable
alternatives available to them."12 This approach
could at least minimize the difficulties of administer-
ing a right to treatment which so concerned the
petitioner and Chief.Justice Burger in this case.
..
2In Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.
1971), aff'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974), the district court permitted represen-
tatives of the parties to that class action to fashion their own
remedy and then reviewed its reasonableness. This would
appear to be a particularly useful judicial technique.
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